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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY BALLEN, 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
GEORGE A. GASP ARAC, JR., 
Respondent. 
Case 
No. 7354 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMEN'T 
This is an appeal from the judgment made and 
entered by the Honorable J. Allan Crockett, of the Third 
Judicial District, in and for Summit County, State of 
Utah, on the 30th day of November, 1948, and made final 
by the Order of said Court,. overruling the Motion for 
New Trial in s-aid case on the 21st day of March, 1949. 
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The Complaint alleges as follows : 
"Plaintiff complains of defendant and for 
cause of action alleges: 
1. That theretofore and particularly for a 
period of over two years, prior to this date, very 
friendly, confidential and social relationship 
existed between the plaintiff and the defendant, 
in that plaintiff had been engaged to marry the 
defendant, by which the close relationship here-
inbefore grew out of. 
2. That plaintiff and defendant were desir--
ous of operating a business in which they were 
mutually and jointly interested in, and being one 
of the nature of a joint undertaking. 
3. That during the period aforesaid, p·lain-
tiff had certain available money and avenues by 
which other monies could be obtained for the 
operation of a. business, while the defendant was 
in reduced financial condition, such that plaintiff 
and defendant conceived the plan to purchase a 
piece of real property in s·ummit County, Utah, 
hereinafter described, and to erect thereupon a 
lodge, which would serve meals to traveling tran-
sients and would operate all the year around and 
particularly during the winter when skiing was 
1n vogue. 
4. That this undertaking was on the basis 
that plaintiff would supply what available money 
she had and what monies would be necessary to 
erect a lodge as aforesaid, and operate the same, 
and that defendant was to use his labor in the 
erection of said lodge, which would be charged as 
against an interest in said business and that the 
p·arties thereto would then determine the ·propor-
tionate interest in said lodge undertaking. 
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5. That pursuant to ~aid plan the plaintiff 
did advance to the defendant the sum of $500.00 
on September 20, 1946 and $2,500.00 on October 
17, 1946, \Yhich said sum of $3,000.00 \vas used to 
purchase the following described property located 
in Sun1n1it County, State of Utah, and more par-
ticularly described as follo\vs, to-wit: 
Beginning at the Northeast Corner of 
the ~ orthwest quarter of the Southeast quar-
ter of Section 10, Township 1 South, Range 
3 East, Salt Lake Meridian~ thence West 
4.62.9 feet; thence South 82° 00' West 250.9 
feet; thence North go 00' 'Vest 35.5 feet; 
thence West 603.5 feet; thence South 0° 02.' 
East 1320 feet; thence East 1320 feet; thence 
North oo 02' West 1320 feet to p·oint of be-
ginning, containing 39.898 acres more or less. 
Beginning at a point 1,671.2 feet South 
and 1,577.1 feet West of the Northeast corner 
of Section 10, Township 1 South, Range 3 
East, Salt Lake Meridian, which is a steel 
pipe set in concrete cap marked ''Highway 
Right of Way;" thence South 48° 21' West 
362.8 feet; thence South 70° 00' East 396.4 
feet; thence South 10° 00' West 304.6 feet; 
thence South oo 02' East 293.0 feet to the 
East-West center line of Section 10, where 
the Northeast corner of the Northwest quar-
ter of the Northeast quarter of Section 10 
bears East 21.9 feet; thence West 441.0 feet, 
thence North 82° 00' East 193.5 feet; thence 
North go 00' West 196.2 feet; thence South 
82° 00' West 418.8 feet, whence the Northwest 
corner 2 acre tract bears South 82° 00' West 
25.6 feet; thence North oo 2' West 445.8 feet; 
to intersection of Highway Right of Way, 
thence North 61 o 58' East 236.4 feet to High-
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way Right of W-ay marker, thence North 60° 
12' East 501.0 feet to point of beginning, con-
taining 9.572 acres more or less, together with 
all water rights appurtenant and belonging to 
said premises. Excepting, however, a Right 
of Way one and one half Rods wide from 
County Road to the North·vvest corner_ of said 
Section 10 aforesaid. 
6. That defendant did purchase the afore-
said property and did place the same in his indi-
vidual name. That subsequently thereto, plain-
tiff advanced the sum of $600.00 on October 19, 
1946, and $5,500.00 on December 7, 1946, which 
monies were used for the erection of what is 
known as Little Pine Lodge and that defendant 
upon the erection of said building did operate 
said Lodge and until on or about October, 1947, 
when said Lodge was closed. 
7. That in addition to the aforesaid sums, 
plaintiff further advanced the sum of $4,343.00 to 
the defendant, which was used by the defendant 
in the operation of the said business. 
7. That at the time of the defendant's ac-
quiring the real property hereinbefore described 
and on numerous occasions, subsequent thereto, 
and as the inducement therefor, said defendant 
expressly declared, promised and represented that 
he would transfer to the plaintiff, by proper deed, 
her equity in the property when it was determined 
the amount of equity which the defendant had 
earne_d by his labor in erecting the Lodge on said 
premises. 
8. That :plaintiff upon numerous occasions 
since on or about the month of October 1946 has 
' ' requested the defendant to execute and deliver to 
her a 1).roper deed to said land, but that defendant 
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has refused so to do, such that although plaintiff 
has paid for said land and the major portion of 
the erection of said Lodge, and therefore has an 
equitable title to the sanlP, yet the legal title is 
still in said defendant. · 
9. That the defendant has never rendered an 
accounting of his labor in the erection of said 
Lodge, such that this plaintiff has no knowledge 
as to 'Yhat proportionate interest is claimed by 
said defendant in the total expenditures for the 
purchase of the land and erection of the Lodge 
and operation of said business, and that no ac-
counting of said business has been demanded and 
that defendant still fails and refuses to render 
such an ac-counting or transfer such proportionate 
interest as is equitable to the plaintiff in and to 
the real prop·erty hereinbefore mentioned. 
10. That plaintiff is informed and. believes 
and on such information and belief alleges that 
the said defendant has listed with the MultipJe 
Listing Bureau of Salt Lake City, Utah, the afore-
said property for sale, and not to account for the 
proceeds thereof to the plaintiff. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment that 
the defendant George A. Gasparac, Jr., be or-
dered to give a full and complete accounting of 
his stewardship in this matter of all of the sums, 
profits, rentals and amounts of every kind and 
nature ever ·collected in this operation. 
That defendant be required to pay to :plaintiff 
herein, the amount found to be due to her by 
reason of said accounting. 
That up·on determination of the proportionate 
interest of said plaintiff and defendant in said 
undertaking, that the Court enter a Decree, vest-
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ing the title of said tract of land in the plaintiff, 
in the interest thereinbefore determined. 
That an Order be made dissolving said joint 
undertaking and for all costs of suit and such 
other and further Order as n1ay to the Court seem 
meet and proper in the premises.'' 
(Duly verified) 
The Answer and Cross Complaint of the defendant 
is as follows : 
''Comes now the defendant and for answer to 
plaintiff's complaint on file herein admits, denies, 
and alleges as follows, to-wit: 
1. Defendant admits the allegations contain-
ed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of plaintiff's complaint. 
2. Answering paragraph 3, defendant admits 
the allegations contained therein excep~t that part 
thereof which states that "the defendant was in 
reduced financial condition". 
3. Answering paragraph 4, defendant alleges 
the undertaking was on the basis that necessary 
money or monies would be provided by one Anna 
Uriona also known as Anna Lujan, the mother of 
plaintiff, and that plaintiff and defendant would 
repay said Anna U riona from any profits which 
might accure from the said undertaking. Defend-
ant further denies that there was any agreement 
that a determination of the proportionate inte-rest 
in the lodge undertaking would be made. 
4. Defendant admits the allegations contained 
in paragraph 5 of plaintiff's complaint. 
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5. Ans"~ering' paragraph 6, defendant admits 
that the said p·roperty was purchased and that the 
same was placed in his individual name and that 
a building known as Little Pine Lodge was erected 
and that defendant, upon the erection of said 
building did operate said lodge until on or about 
October 1947 when said lodge was closed; but 
haYing no knowledge concerning amounts of 
money allegedly advanced by plaintiff, denies each 
and every ·allegation referring to such advances. 
6. Answering paragraph 7, defendant denies 
each and every allegation therein contained. 
7. Ans"Tering paragraph 8, defendant denies 
each and every allegation therein contained. 
8. Answering paragraph 9, defendant alleges 
that all of the records in connection \vith the 
erection and operation of said lodge have been 
kept by ·plaintiff under agreement bet"reen plain-
tiff and defendant and that defendant has not 
been granted access to said records by the plain-
tiff and is accordingly unable to render an account-
ing and further that he has no knowledge or 
information concerning the financial status of the 
undertaking. 
9. Answering ~paragraph 10, defendant denies 
that said property was listed with the Multiple 
Listing Bureau of Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
further denies that there has been any sale of 
said property. 
10. Defendant denies each and every allega-
tion of said complaint not herein · specifically 
admitted, modified or denied. 
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CRoss CoMPLAINT 
Comes now the defendant and for cause of 
action against plaintiff complains and alleges as 
follows, to wit: 
1. That heretofore, and particularly for a 
period of over two years, prior to this date, a very 
friendly, confidential and social relationship 
existed between the plaintiff and the defendant, 
in that plaintiff had been engaged to marry the 
defendant, by which the close relationship here-
inbefore grew out of. 
2. That plaintiff and defendant were desirous 
of operating a business in which they would be 
mutually and jointly interested. 
3. That during the period aforesaid, plaintiff 
had certain available money and avenues by which 
other monies could be obtained for the operation 
of a business, . such that plaintiff and defendant 
conceived a plan to purchase a piece of real prop-
erty in Summit County, Utah, hereinafter describ-
ed, and to erect thereupon a lodge, which would 
serve meals to traveling transients and would 
operate all year around and particularly during 
the winter when skiing was in vogue. 
4. 'That it was agreed between the parties that 
plaintiff would p~rovide certain money and that 
her mother, Anna Uriona, also known as Anna 
Lujan, would also provide necessary money for 
the erection of a lodge as aforesaid. That the 
defendant was to contribute his services and labor 
in the erection of said lodge and that on the com-
pletion thereof plaintiff would leave her employ-
ment in Salt Lake City and would devote her full 
time to the operation of said lodge. 
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her mother, the said .... -\.nna Uriona, advanced cer-
tain sun1s of money, "\Yhich Inoney \Vas used to 
purchase property, located in Summit County, 
State of Utah, and ,,~hich is n1ore particularly 
described in paragraph 5 of plaintiff's complaint 
on file herein; that said property was purchased 
in the individual naine of the defendant. 
6. That after the purchase of the property 
as aforesaid, defendant gave up his employment 
and during the :period from September 1946 to 
February 1947, devoted his full time and efforts 
to and completed the erection of lodge on the said 
property which said lodge is kno,vn as Little Pine 
Lodge; that said lodge was erected as a result 
of the work and efforts of the defendant; that 
defendant devised the plans of said lodge, 
arranged for the installation of the equipment 
therein, the laying of necessary "\Vater mains and 
landscaped the surrounding premises; that as a 
result of his connection with various mining com-
panies in Summit County, Utah, defendant was 
able to obtain critical building materials and other 
critical items which were difficult to obtain on the 
market and without vvhich the lodge could not be 
properly completed; that the contribution of 
defendant to the erection of said lodge has a rea-
sonable value of $8,000.00. 
7. That after the erection of said lodge \Vas 
completed and opened for business in February 
1947, plaintiff and defendant worked at the lodge 
and operated the same during the ·period from 
Fehruary to May 1947; that during said period, 
the lodge operated at a profit and gave indication 
of becoming a p~rosperous undertaking; that in 
May 1947, plaintiff, contrary to her agreement as 
aforesaid, discontinued her work at the lodge and 
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from that thne until' the present time has not 
assisted in any way in the operation of said lodge 
except for a period of a few days in August 1947; 
that from May to November 1947, defendant was 
required to and did operate the lodge alone with-
out help from plaintiff and that during this period 
no profits whatsoever were made from the venture. 
8. That during the period from October to 
December 1947, defendant finished two upstairs 
rooms in said lodge, which rooms have substan-
tially increased the value of the lodge. 
9. That before and since the erection of the 
said lodge, defendant has made substanti~l mone-
tary advances to the venture; that sai_d advances 
have been used for the purchase of materials and 
for the payment of various expenses in connection 
with op·eration of the said business; that said 
advances amount to $1995.77. 
10. That since February 1947, all records and 
accounts in connection with the venture have been 
kept and maintained by the plaintiff and that she 
still is the custodian of all books, records and 
monies of the said business; that defendant has 
no knowledge of the accounts incident to said 
business. 
11. That plaintiff has at various times made 
monetary advances to the undertaking but that 
the amounts thereof and other details in connec-
tion therewith are unknown to the defendant. 
12. That defendant has been at all times 
ready, willing, and able and is now ready, willing, 
and able to execute a deed to the plaintiff covering 
said property on receipt from plaintiff of the 
amount representing the value of his contribution 
to said business. 
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''THEREFORE, defendant ·pTays judgment as 
follows: 
1. That the complaint of plaintiff on file here-
in be by the Court dismissed and that upon said 
con1plaint Judgment of the No Cause of Action 
be n1ade and entered by the Court in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiff. 
2. ·That the plaintiff be ordered to give a full 
and complete accounting of her stewardship in 
connection with all sums, profits and amounts of 
every kind and nature whatsoever arising out of 
said undertaking. 
3. That plaintiff be ordered to pay to defend-
ant the amount found to he due him by reason of 
said accounting. 
4. That a division order be made in connec-
tion with the proportionate share of each owner 
on said property. 
5. That an order be made dissolving said joint 
undertaking and for all costs of suit and such 
other and further order as may to the court seem 
1neet and rp:roper in the premises.'' 
(Duly verified) 
The Reply of plaintiff is as follows: 
''Comes now the plaintiff and for reply to de-
fendant's Answer, admits, denies and alleges as 
follows: 
1. Replying to paragraph 3 of defendant's 
Answer, plaintiff denies the same. 
2. Replying to paragraph 8 of defendant's 
Answer, plaintiff denies the same. 
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For reply to defendant's Cross Complaint: 
1. Replying to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of de-
fendant's Cross Complaint, plaintiff admits tne 
same. 
2. Replying to paragraph 4 of defendant's 
Cross Complaint ,plaintiff denies ''that it was 
agreed between the parties that plaintiff would 
provide certain money and that her mother, Anna 
Uriona also known as Anna Lujan, would also 
provide necessary money for the erection of a 
lodge as aforesaid". Admits'' that defendant was 
to contribute his services and labor in the erec-
tion of said lodge", but denies "that on the com-
pletion thereof plaintiff would leave her employ-
ment in Salt Lake City and would devote her full 
time to the operation of said lodge''. 
3. Replying to paragraph 5 of defendant's 
Cross Complaint plaintiff admits ''that :pursuant 
to said plan, plain tiff advanced certain sums of 
money, which money was used to purchase prop-
erty located in Summit County, State of Utah, 
and which is more particularly described in para-
graph 5 of plaintiff's complaint on file herein; and 
that said property was purchased in the individ-
ual name of defendant'', but denies that her 
mother, the said Anna Uriona, advanced certain 
sums of money, which money was used to pur-
chase property located in Summit County, State 
of Utah, and which is more particularly described 
in :paragraph 5 of plaintiff's complaint on file 
herein. 
4. Replying to paragraph 6 of defendant's 
Cross Complaint, plaintiff denies the same. 
5. Replying to paragraph 7 of defendant's 
Cross Complaint plaintiff admits ''that after the 
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erection of said lodge \Yas cornpleted and opened 
for business in February 1947, plaintiff and de-
fendant \vorked at the lodge and operated the 
san1e during the period from February to May 
1947' ', but denies • • that during said period, the 
lodge operated at a profit and gave indication of 
becoming a prosperous undertaking'' ; denies 
"'that in May 1947, plaintiff, contrary to her 
agreement as aforesaid, discontinued her work at 
the lodge and from that tirne until the present 
tirue has not assisted in any \Yay in the operation 
of S'aid lodge, except for a period of a few days in 
.... ~ugust 1947"; denies "that from May to N ovem-
ber 1947, defendant was required to and did oper-
ate the lodge alone without help from plaintiff, 
that during this period no profits vYhatsoever were 
made from the venture''. 
6. Replying to paragraph 8 of defendant's 
Cross Complaint this plaintiff has no information 
or knowledge as to the facts alleged in said para-
graph and therefore denies the same. 
7. Replying to paragraph 9 of defendant's 
Cross Complaint :plaintiff denies the same. 
8. Replying to paragraph 10 of defendant's 
Cross Complaint plaintiff denies "that since Feb-
ruary 1947, all records and accounts in connec-
tion with the venture have been kept and main-
tained by the plaintiff and that she still is the 
custodian of all books, records and monies of the 
said business". D·enies ''that defendant has no 
knowledge of the ·accounts incident to said busi-
ness''; admits that plaintiff has certain ledger 
accounts and check books which are incident and 
part of said business. 
9. Replying to paragraph 11 of defendant's 
Cross Complaint, plaintiff admits that she has at 
various times made monetary advances to the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
undertaking but denies that the amount thereof 
and other d~tails in connection therewith are un-
known to the defendant. 
10. Re:plying to paragraph 12 of the defend-
ant's Cross Complaint, plaintiff denies the same. 
WHER.EFORE, plaintiff having fully replied 
to defendant's Answer and Cross Complaint, 
plaintiff prays judgment as follows: 
1. That judgment be entered in accordance 
with the prayer of plaintiff's complaint and that 
defendant's Cross Complaint be dismissed.'' 
(Duly Verified) 
U[)on these pleadings, the trial 'v.as had before the 
Court without a jury and the Judgment appealed from 
was entered in behalf of plaintiff and defendant, and to 
reverse and set aside this said Judgment, this appeal is 
taken. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR UPON WHICH 
PLAINTIFF RELIES FOR REVERSAL 
Plaintiff eontends that the trial Court erred in the 
following particulars : 
1. In admitting evidence offered by defendant and 
objected to by plaintiff in an attempt to prove the value 
of labor of defendant and ·monies expended by defendant 
in 1proof of defendant's counterclaim, when no bill of 
particulars was submitted until examination of defendant 
at trial, when bill of particulars had been duly de1nanded. 
2. Not finding on material issues of accounting of 
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monies adYaneed by the pl;aintif£ to the account of de-
fendant. 
3. In finding as it did in Paragraph 6 of the Find-
ings of Fart as follo,Ys: 
''That during and since the erection of the 
lodge, defendant has made monetary advances to 
the venture totaling $1,388.49' ', 
and entering its conclusions of law based on said finding 
that defendant was entitled to 23% of the :p,roceeds re-
sulting from the sale of the property for the following 
reasons: 
(a) That defendant made no accounting of monies 
advanced nor did he show that there 'vas not sufficient 
monies advanced by plaintiff or income from sales to 
pay the bills claimed by defendant. 
(b) That monies claimed paid by defendant were 
not proven by competent evidence. 
4. In finding as it did in Paragraph 8 of the Find-
ings of Fact as follows : 
"That the services performed by the defend-
ant from September, 1946 to February, 1947, in 
erecting the lodge have a reasonable value of 
$2,160.00, said amount being based on an average 
of ten hours work per day for six days per week 
for 24 weeks at the rate of $1.50 per hour; that 
the services 1J•erformed by the defendant in man-
aging, operating and maintaining the lodge dur-
ing the period from February, 1947, until June, 
1947, have a reasonable value of $1,440.00, said 
amount being based on an average of ten hours 
per day for six days per week for 16 weeks at 
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the rate of $1.50 ·per hour; that the services per-
formed by the defendant in managing, operating 
and maintaining the lodge for the period from 
June to November, 1947, have a reasonable value 
of $714.00, said amount being based on an aver-
age of seven hours p·er day for six days per week 
for 17 weeks at the rate of $1.00 per hour," 
and entering its Conclusion of Law based on said Find-
ing that defendant after payment of debts from the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the ~property was entitled to 23% 
thereof, f.or the following reason: 
(a) ·That th~ only evidence of the value of the 
service of defendant is the rute of $1.00 per hour and 
the total number of hours worked is speculative. 
ARGUMEN'T 
I. 
IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OFFERED BY DEFENDANT AND OB-
JECTED TO BY PLAINTIFF IN AN ATTEMPT TO PROVE THE VALUE 
OF LABOR OF DEFENDANT AND MONIES EXPENDED BY DEFEND-
ANT IN PROOF OF DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM, /WHEN NO 
BILL OF PARTICULARS WAS SUBMITTED UNTIL EXAMINATION 
OF DEFENDANT AT TRIAL, WHEN BILL OF PARTICULARS HAD 
BEEN DULY DEMANDED. 
The statute here involved is 104-13-3: 
''104-13-3. AN ACCOUNT, HOW PLEAD-
ED- BILL OF PARTIC·ULARS. 
''It is not necess'ary for a p·arty to set forth 
in a pleading the items of an account therein al-
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leged, but he must deliYer to the adverse party, 
within ten days after a den1and therefor in writ-
ing~ a copy of the account, or be precluded from 
giving evidence thereof. The court, or a judge 
thereof~ may order a further account \\'"hen the 
one delivered is too general or is defective in any 
particular.' ' 
The record is further born out in that a demand for 
bill of particulars 'Yas served on the 29th day of July, 
1948, and filed July 30, 1948 ( R. 13). 
The case proceeded to trial on the 15th day of No-
vember, 1948, ap·pellant adducing her evidence, and re-
spondent taking the stand and being asked general ques-
tions until the question of proof of the value of respond-
ent's labor came up. (R. 78) 
Direct examination of George Gaspara.c, Jr., by 
Mr. Neslen: 
''Q. And how was that accomplished, did you, 
in fact, build the Lodge~ 
MR. BEATIE: Just a moment, I am going to 
object to that question on the ground that this 
particular witness is not competent, and I object, 
further, that the question in effect is an attempt 
to get a general statement with reference to the 
work entailed on the part of this prarticular de-
fendant, which we ob·ject to, on the grounds that 
there has been a demand for a bill of p-articulars 
in this particular case which has been outstanding 
for over five months, and, up until the present 
moment, none has ever been supplied, nor deliv-
ered. We therefore object to any testimony with 
reference to any of the construction work by this 
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particular defendant, and I cite your Honor, I 
have a California case, a recent California case, 
with reference to this particular thing under our 
same statute, if you desire to hear it. 
(Discussion.) 
MR. NESLEN: May I state I have a bill of 
particulars here that I intended to file, but which, 
in view of the misunderstanding today, I wasn't 
able to do, and it has been signed by ~ir. Gas-
parae. 
(Discussion.) 
THE COURT : This is off the record, Miss 
Reporter. 
(Discussion.) 
THE COURT : And I believe I am going to 
let you file it. I think it improper-! don't think 
this matter has had quite the attention it should 
have had, both with respect to its coming to trial 
today and also. the filing of that, but I am reluc-
tant to adhere to the penalty p~rescribed by stat-
ute because we just can't find out the facts ap-
parently and do justice between these parties 
without looking into the matter of Mr. Gasparac's 
claims. 
If this bill of particulars, by any reason, or 
for any reason, takes Mr. Beatie by surprise, or 
puts them to any disadvantage because of its late 
filing, I will simply continue the matter for suf-
ficient time for him to meet any difficulties that 
might arise because of its failure and because of 
the failure to file it before this time, and you may 
file it at this time, and go ahead and receive evi-
dence concerning the matter. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
The last question \Ya8 put to him wouldn't 
haYe been helpful, any,Yay, if he had ansvvered. 
Did you build it J? Let's find out vvhat he did. 
:JlR. XESLEX: That is \Yhat I \Yant to ask 
him. 
Q. ~lr. Gasparac, in building this Lodge, just 
explain to the court "~hat you did . 
..._\. \\Tell, I did just about everything-! mean, 
I took care of-
THE COURT : Let me see a copy of the bill 
of particulars, will you pleas-e' 
:\IR. NESLEN: Do you want him to p~roceed, 
your Honor~ 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BEATIE: May I make one observation 
bill of particulars which is now served on me in 
\Yith respect to this-may I make exception to the 
that the S"ame does not disclose any material, 
such as, for instance, as an i tern after the total 
$22.021, "September '46 to July '47, full time 
work in building Lodge at the rate of $600 a 
month, eleven months, $6,600''; now, that doesn't 
disclose anything; he may have charg~d $600 one 
month and five hundred the next, and doesn't tell 
me whether that is a standard rate or whether 
there was any agreement or hoV\T many hours 
work or anything of the nature. I say, bill itself 
is very uncertain, gives me nothing except-
reading-! don't know whether purchased Park 
City, Heber, or whether purchased Salt Lake City. 
THE COURT: Don't know what kind of 
lumber, or anything of the kind; very general, I 
will s·ay that, but let's go ahead and examine the 
witness.'' 
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Thus it is apparent that appellant in no respect 
kne,~,r how much labor res'pondent had expended or what 
monies were advanced by him in the building of the 
Little Pine Lodge. 
The following cases ·are on this first point that with-
out the filing of a Bill of Particulars the party required 
to file the sa1ne by statute cannot adduce evidence as to 
said account. 
Inland Engineering & Construction Co .. , v. Mary-
land ·Casualty Comp1any, et al, 290 Pac. page 367, 76 
Utah, page 435. 
J. Elias Hansen, said at page 377: 
''The penalty, and the only penalty, p-rescrib-
ed by statute for the failure of a party to furnish 
a bill of particulars when demand is made, is that 
the ·party so in default is ''precluded from giving 
evidence thereof." Comp. Laws Utah 1917, No. 
6598. If, therefore, a bill of particulars is de-
manded, but not furnished or filed, and if at the 
trial the ~party demanding the bill of particulars 
fails to object to the introduction of evidence 
upon the ground that a bill of particulars has not 
been furnished or filed, it would seem to follow 
that the failure of the adverse party to furnish 
or file a bill of particulars is thereby waived.'' 
Sanborn v. D-entler, 166 Pac., 62, 97 Wash. 149, 6 
A.L.R. 749. 
J. Holcomb said at page 63 : 
"It is contended by respondent that the re-
quiring of a bill of particulars is a rna tter of dis-
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cretion "~ith the court, and that respondent \Yas 
exrused from furnishing the bill of particulars of 
these items under the allegation in connection 
there"~ith that the exact ainount of Inedicine given 
at each Yisit, or its value, could not be positively 
ascertained, and that the fair Yalue of such medi-
cine given each Yisit could not be stated. It is 
true that in many cases the requireinent of a bill 
of particulars is a. rna tter of discretion with the 
court; but under our practice, under Section 284, 
Rem. Code, when an account is sued upon, unless 
the party, ·within 10 days after demand therefor 
in "Triting by the adverse party, shall deliver to 
the adverse p·arty a verified bill of particulars of 
the items of the account, he is p·recluded from 
giving evidence thereof, and in case an itemized 
account stated is defective the court may order a 
further account. It was shown at the trial that 
the respondent kept an account hook with all his 
accounts shown therein, and that the particular 
items of account with Mr. and Mrs. Woodman . 
were kept in that book in the ordinary course of 
business, together with other accounts, and all 
the items of the visits and memoranda as to the 
nature of the ailments with which the patients 
were suffering were kept therein. 
''In Plummer v. Well, 15 \Vash. 427, 46 Pac. 
648, we held that an allegation in connection with 
the bill of particulars, to the effect that it was im-
possible for the party relying thereon to comply 
with the order of the court any better than he had 
already done, or to make the bill of particulars 
any more specific on the :points directed in the 
order of the court furnished no excuse; and it 
was stated that the bill of particulars furnished 
was insufficient, and ''Its insufficiency cannot be 
excused upon the ground that plaintiff kept no 
books and cannot specify the services or state 
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their value. l-Ie assumed the burden of so doing 
when he brought this action in the present form. 
* .:~ * "The failure to keep an account of these 
services is the fault of the plaintiff and he must 
suffer for it, if any one' ''. Again, in Moore v. 
Scharnikow, 48 Wash. 564, 94 Pac. 117, it was 
said: 
''In a mercantile account, or in any account 
which is made up of several and distinct items, it 
is proper for the court to require that the value 
of each article be separatPly stated. So also a 
physician since he bases the value of his services 
on the number of visits made the patient, or the 
number of prescri1>tions given him, may be re-
quired to set out in his bill of items the charge 
made for each visit, or each prescription.'' 
"It certainly was as possible for respondent 
to itemize the quantity and value of the medicine 
furnished by him at each visit, when making his 
entries in his book, and it was for him to itemize 
the number and length of his visits, the nature 
of the other s-ervices performed by him, and the 
kind of medicines furnished. If he could not, he 
is the one who should suffer. Under the statute 
heretofore quoted we think his evidence as to the 
amount and value of the medicines furnished 
should have been excluded for his failure to fur-
nish, upon demand, a bill of particulars thereof.'' 
Lonsdale v. Oltmwn, 52 N. W. 131, 50 Minn. 52. 
C. J. Giffin said ~at page 131: 
''In this case which was an action to recover 
for services as a surgeon and drugs and medi-
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cines rendered and furnished by plaintiff on 
diYers dates, the defendant, pursuant to the Gen. 
St. 1878, Ch. '66, Sec. 105, served "~ritten notice of 
den1and for a copy of plaintiff's account, which 
"
7 as disregarded. ..A .. t the trial the defendant at 
the proper time objected to eYidence of the ac-
count for the reason that the demand had not 
been complied " ... ith and the objection "\Vas over-
ruled. The statute is e~plicit, that upon failure 
to furnish the copy when demanded, the party 
shall 'be precluded from giving evidence there-
of. ' .... \11 that the ·party demanding need do at 
the trial is to make timely and proper objection 
bringing to the knowledge of the court the fact 
of such demand. '' 
W. C. Early cf; Co., et al. v. Long, 42 So. 348. 
C. J. \~Vbitfield said at page 348: 
''The court below should not have permit-
ted any evidence to be introduced by the defend-
ant for the reason that no bill of particulars was 
furnished by the defendant after demand made 
upon him in strict compliance with the statute. 
Sec. 1652 Code 1892. '' 
Columbus d!; Greenville Ry. Co. v. Miss. Clinic, 120 
So. 203. 
J. Anderson said at page 205: 
"Under the statute appellant was entitled to 
a bill of particulars of ap'p•ellee 's demand in order 
that appellant might intelligently make defense 
thereto. Anything less than an itemized account 
setting out each visit made by Dr. Yales and the 
charge therefore "\vould not be a bill of particu-
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lars. When the statute is not cornplied 'vith in 
that respect by its expre~s language no evidence 
is admissible to establish the account. Flint & 
Co. v. Brown, 133 Miss. 9; 96 So. 402. Wolff v. 
Hopkins, 145 Miss. 827, 111 So. 290. It follows 
that the court erred in admitting the testimony 
of Dr. Yales in the absence of such an itemized 
account.'' 
Fisher v. Brotherton, et al, 255 Pac. 854, 82 Cal. 
App. 532. 
J. Nourse said at pages 857-8 : 
''The error committed in permitting respond-
ent, in the course of her examinations before the 
referee, to refer to the bill of particulars which 
had been prepared by her counsel, is of a differ-
ent character. VVhen the respondent gave her 
notice of rescission of the contract, she included 
a demand upon appellant that he pay the sum of 
$6,860 to reimburse her for the moneys ·expended 
by her in the care and maintenance of the ranch, 
which sum she alleged to be in excess of ~all moneys 
which she had received from the proceeds of the 
operation of the ranch. Her complaint was filed 
October 8, 1918, and on November 6, 1918, the ap-
pellant served upon her a demand for a bill of 
particulars covering such items. This demand 
was ignored, and the caus-e went to trial on De-
cember 20, 1918; the first trial resulting in 'a 
judgment for the ap·pellant herein. Thereafter, 
and on the 18th day of June, 1920, a new trial 
having been granted, th-e cause again came on for 
trial and the matter of adjustment of accounts of 
operation of the respondent's properties was 
order·ed heard before a referee. 
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" .. ..-\ .. t this hearing a bill of particulars dated 
June 12, 1920, "~as offered by the res~pondent and 
the objection of the appellant that it '\Yas inad- . 
missible, because a copy had not been delivered 
'vithin the time required by la\v, vvas overruled. 
Exception to this ruling \Ya~ certified to the trial 
court and the ruling \vas sustained. This was 
error. Section 454, Code of Civil Procedure, pro-
vides that, \\""hen a party demands a bill of par-
ticulars covering the items of an account in suit, 
a copy thereof must be delivered within five days 
after the demand ; otherwise evidence thereof is 
to be precluded. In St. John v. Consolidated Con-
struction Co., 182 Cal. 25, 28, 189 P. 276, 277, the 
Supreme Court held that it was within the power 
of the trial court to relieve a party from his de-
fault in complying with the demand for a bill of 
particulars, and we assume that what was meant 
by this decision is that, wh·en timely ap!plication 
is made under section 473, Code of Civil Proce-
dure, for relief from the mistake, in~advertence, 
or neglect of the party, the court may grant the 
relief as if some order or proceeding had been 
taken against the party in default. There is, how-
ever, no uncertainty in the meaning of Section 
454 of the Code that, when the demand is, not 
com·pJied with within the prescribed time, the 
party is thereby precluded from giving evidence 
on the subject-matter of the account. As the rec-
ord stands here, no applieation for relief from 
this default was requested or granted, and all 
evidence touching the subject-matter included in 
that demand was improperly admitted.'' 
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Vassere v. Joerger, 68 Pac. (2d) 363. 
J. Fullen said at page 364 : 
''The defendant. demanded a bill of particu-
lars, the plaintiff failed to comply with this de-
mand within five days as :provided by s·ection 454 
of the Code of Civil Procedure, and defendant 
noticed a motion to exclude evidence thereof at 
the trial. This motion was granted conditionally, 
the court granting plaintiff an additional ten days 
in which to file a bill of particulars. No bill -vvas 
ever filed, and upon that ground it -vvas proper 
for the court to enter a judgment of dismissal of 
the action.·'' 
Elm.ore v. Tingley, 248 P~ac. 706, 78 Cal. .A!pp. 460. 
J. Hart said at page 710: 
''The failure of the defendant to deliver to 
the p~laintiff within the time required a copy of 
the account upon which the counterclaim first set 
up in the answer was based, justified the trial 
court, in the exercise of its discretion, in refusing 
to allow defendant to introduce evidence tending 
to p·rove the account.'' 
Munger v. Nelson, 201 Pac. 286, 61 Mont. 104. 
The Court said at page 288: 
''Furthermore, it does not appear from the 
record that the pl~aintiff made any response what-
soever to the defendant's demand for a bill of 
particulars. On the faee of the com~plaint it ap-
pears that this is a case where a bill of particu-
lars may properly be demanded. Hence, had this 
default not been t~aken at all, the plaintiff could 
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not, as a n1atter of right, have den1anded to be 
heard at the trial. Section 6569, R. C.; Martin v. 
Heinze, 31 :Jlont. 68, 77 Pac. 427 ; Scott v. Frost, 
4 Colo . ..._\pp. 557, 36 Pac. 910. 
"',,..,. e find no reversible error in this cause and 
recommend that the judgment appealed from be 
affirmed.' ' 
McJ.llanus v. Larson et al, 10 Pac. (2d) 523, 122 Cal. 
App. 716. 
Justice pro tern Tappaan said at pages 524-5: 
''Defendants on 1\fay 13, 1929, the pl~aintiff 
still having failed to comply with defendant's de-
mand for a bill of particulars served upon plain-
tiff a notice that a motion to preclude the plain-
tiff from giving evidence of the account would 
be made on the 20th day of May, 1929. The court 
granted defendants' motion upon the day desig-
nated in the notice, and, on the same day the de-
fendants' motion to preclude evidence was grant-
ed, plaintiff served and filed what purported to 
be a bill of particulars of the account. Thereafter 
plaintiff made a motion under section 473 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, to be relieved from the 
order precluding evidence, iand on June 6, 1929, 
this latter motion was denied by the court. The 
cause came on for trial on June 18, 1929, and the 
court acting under the order made May 20, 1929, 
precluding evidence, sustained an objection to the 
evidence tendered by plaintiff in support of the 
allegation of his complaint. Judgment was there-
after ,entered for defendants. Plaintiff appeals 
from the order ~precluding evidence, the order 
denying relief under section 473 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, and from the judgment entered 
in defendants' favor. 
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"The first question upon this appeal is 
whether the trial court committed error in sus-
taining defendants' motion to preclude evidence. 
The failure on the part of plaintiff to comply 
with the demand for a bill of particulars, prior 
to the date upon which the motion to preclude 
evidence was heard and granted, is admitted, and 
in fact it appears. At the hearing had upon this 
motion, an affid~vit of plaintiff's assignor was 
filed in opposition to the motion, in which affi-
davit the assignor stated that defendants, some 
years before the filing of the affidavit, had been 
informed of the items of the account and were 
aware of their nature, but that the account cov-
ered a long period, and because of its great detail 
required considerable time for preparation, which 
time assignor did not have because of other duties. 
·The record shows that plaintiff had over 50 days 
since the service of the demand for the bill of par-
ticulars within which to prepare the bill of par-
ticulars, and that more than 40 days before the 
motion was granted defendants' attorney inform-
ed pl!aintiff's attorney that, if the bill was not fur-
nished, he would object to the introduction of 
evidenc-e of the account. That the procedure as 
adopted by defendants was justified under the 
circumstances is beyond question. Motions of this 
kind are addressed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court. The record fails to disclose that the 
trial court in granting this motion exercised other 
than a sound discretion. McCarthy v. Mt. Tecarte 
L. & W. Co., 110 Cal. 687, 693, 43 P. 391. Plaintiff 
had ample time within which to prepare the bill, 
was informed by defendants more than a month 
prior to the filing of the motion that defendants 
would stand upon the terms of the section of the 
Code precluding evidence if the bill was not 
served and at the time of the granting of the 
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n1otion the trial upon· the merits "~as set only 11 
days away.'' 
Proto v. Chenoweth, 263 Pac., page 943. 
C. J. R.oss said at pages 944 and 945: 
""The next assignment is that the court erred 
in permitting the plaintiff to testify as to the 
services rendered the deceased, for the reason 
that, although a demand had been made for a 
copy of plaintiff's account, or a bill of particulars, 
none had been delivered to defendant or his at-
torneys, and under paragraph 421 plaintiff should 
not have been permitted to introduce any ·evidence 
to support his complaint. The facts in connection 
with this contention we have heretofore stated. 
Paragraph 421 reads as follows : 
"It shall not he necessary for the ~party to set 
forth in a pleading the items of an account there-
in alleged, but he shall deliver to the adverse 
party within ten d~ays after a demand therefor, in 
writing, a copy of the account, or be precluded 
from giving evidence thereof. The court or a 
judge thereof may order a further account when 
the one delivered is too general or is defective in 
any particular. ' ' 
''The reasons given by the courts of code 
states, with a provision like our paragraph 421, 
for holding a pleading not setting forth the items 
of an account as invulnerable to demurr·er, is that 
the adversary may have a copy of the account 
upon demand. The very provision of the statute 
relieving the pleader from pleading the facts of 
the account impos·es upon him the duty to furnish 
his opponent the data omitted from the pleading, 
and p·recludes his giving any evidence of the ac-
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count if he fails to furnish it. Clearly the per-
missible omission in paragraph 421 disregards 
the other statutory provision (paragraph 419, 
Civil Code) that 'the pleadings shall consist of 
a concise statement of the facts constituting the 
plaintiff's cause of action, or the defendant'~ 
ground of defense,' unless such omission is sup-
plied in the form of a bill of ·particulars. The 
common count in the face of the last provision 
finds no justification and can only be reconciled 
therewith by holding that the pleader who uses 
it must comply with the provisions of paragraph 
421, and, when demanded, deliver a copy of this 
account to the adversary party. * * • 
''The reason for requiring an itemized stute-
ment of the account, consisting of items and 
transactions running over a considerable period 
of time, is obvious. It is to inform the adverse 
party with what he is charged and to afford him 
an opportunity to marshall his evidence to meet 
the charges, otherwise he can justly plead sur-
prise and lack of 'pTe para tion, and especially is 
that true in a case like the one at bar. Even if 
Proto were alive and himself the defendant, in-
stead of his personal representative, in all fair-
ness he would be entitled to an itemized statement 
of what he owed-if not before suit, at least before 
trial. How much more is the need of such infor-
mation on the p~art of the administrator, who must 
prepare the defense without any personal knowl-
edge whatever of the items going to make up the 
claim against his testator f It is not unreasonable 
nor harsh treatmeD:t to require one, claiming to 
have rendered professional services on divers 
tim·es and occasions for another, to furnish the 
l~a.tter, or his personal representative, a statement 
of such services in itemized form. 
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··It appears that the courts of those states 
\Yhose statutes are like our paragraph 421, \vhen 
the question of the rights of a ~party failing to 
furnish a bill of particulars on dernand has arisen, 
haYe held the statute is pere1nptory, ·precluding 
such delinquent from offering ~any evidence of 
his account. Sanborn Y. Dentler, 97 Wash. 149, 
166 P. 62, 6 ... ~.L.R. 749; Orange Sav\: Mill Co. v. 
Carmichael Lumber Co., 17 N. M. 69, 1:21 P. 608; 
Lonsdale Y. Oltman, 50 1\Iinn. 52, 52 N. W. 131. 
* * * 
"""\\T e haYe thus far considered the point under 
discussion as though no bill of particulars was 
served upon defendant or filed vvith the court, 
upon its order, and in doing so we !are satisfied 
we are right. What was served upon defendant 
as bills of particulars did not in the least amplify 
or explain the general allegations of the com-
plaint. The difference in the first bill of particu-
lars and the complaint was merely verbal; the 
seeond one changed the claim from one for ser-
vices rendered the ·deceased ''and various other 
·persons'' to one for services rendered the de-
ceased only; but in neither was there any inkling 
given defendant as to the number of visits made 
deceased, or the number made ''various other 
persons,'' or the character of treatment adminis-
tered, or medicines furnished. Since the rule is 
that a bill of p~articulars limits the proof at the 
trial to the items or particular services therein 
set forth, the effect, and the only effect, of the 
last so-called bill of particulars, was to eliminate 
any claim for services rendered 'various other 
persons' thus bringing the claim vvithin the de-
mand :filed with the administrator for allowance. 
When the complaint and the two so-called bills of 
particulars are taken and considered together, 
they not only do not inform defendant what he is 
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required to meet but leave the issues in extreme 
confusion and obscurity. 
''The complaint and last bill of particulars in-
form us that the services rendered deceased were 
so rendered, at his instance and request, continu-
ously for 28 months, and that they were reason-
ably worth $500 per month. We understand from 
this allegation that the services were accepted 
and rendered under a mutual contract and as 
occasion demanded, but without any agreement as 
to the price to be paid or received for the various 
i terns of services. Under such circumstances the 
law says that the party receiving such services 
shall ~~ay their reasonable value and no more. 
Now, how is that to be determined~ It can only 
be determined by finding out what was done for 
the deceased and, by witnesses familiar with the 
value of that kind of services, prove the value. 
How necessary, then, it was that defendant should 
have been informed, in advance of the trial, of 
the amount and character of services claimed to 
have been rendered to his testator, that he might 
prep~are his defense! 'To exempt a plaintiff from 
this duty would not only disregard the statute 
enacted expressly for the guidance of the court, 
but leave a defendant, such as the one here, and 
his testator's estate without much, if any pro-
tection.'' 
Scott v. Frost, 4 Colo. App. 557, 36 Pac. 910. 
J. Reed said at pages 910-11: 
''The defendants made a demand in writing 
.,_.. ~on th"e'f.Jiillifr 1 .,.. for an itemized statement of 
the account sued upon, to which no attention was 
paid by the plaintiff. Upon the trial, objection 
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"~hich 'Yas oyerruled and an exeeption taken. Sec-
tion 63 of the l~ivil Code is aR follows : 'It shall 
not be necessary for a party to set forth in a 
tpleading the items of an account therein alleged; 
but he shall \Yithin five days after a demand 
thereof in 'vriting by the adverse party, deliver 
to him or file a copy of such account or be pre-
cluded from giving evidence thereof. The court 
or judge may on motion, limit or extend the time 
for delivering or filing such an account, 1and may 
order a further account "~hen the one delivered 
or filed is too general or is defective in any par-
ticular.' The items of the different accounts were 
not set forth in the pleading, the statements were 
general,-only general aggregates or balances 
given,-and defendants were entiled to have ~ach 
of the different accounts itemized so that they 
could contest any individual item of any of the 
accounts upon which the suit was brought. The 
statute is peremptory. Upon demand, he shall 
furnish the itemized account, and, upon failure to 
do so, 'shall be precluded from giving evidence 
thereof.' The court erred in receiving any evi-
dence without the accounts. Defendants were en-
titled to be informed, not only of gross ~amounts 
claimed to be due, but of each item going to make 
up the aggregate. For this error the judgment 
must be reversed, and the cause remanded.'' 
Orange Sawmill Co. v. ·Carmichael Lumber Co., 121 
Pac. 608. 
C. J. Roberts said at pages '608-609: 
''The only proposition involved in this cas·e is 
the construction of section 69 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, which is as follows: 'It is not neces-
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sary for a party to set forth in a ·pleadings the 
items of an account therein alleged, but he must 
deliver to the adverse party, within ten days 
after the demand thereof in writing, a copy of 
the account or be precluded from giving evidence 
thereof,' etc. 
"No itemized statement of the account was 
set forth in the complaint, or attached thereto. 
From the record in the case, it appears that the 
attorney for appellee demanded, in writing, of 
appell'ant's attorneys, about four months before 
the trial of the case, an itemized statement of the 
account, which was never furnished him. Upon 
the hearing, counsel for appellant contended that 
an itemized statement of the account was attached 
as an exhibit to a deposition theretofore taken, 
and which was on file in the office of the clerk of 
the district court, from vvhich appellee's counsel 
could have obtained the information desired. 
"That statute is peremptory, and upon p,roper 
demand it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to fur-
nish the itemized statement, and the mere fact 
that depositions may have been on file in the 
clerk's office, which contained an itemized state-
ment of the account, will not obviate the plain 
provision of the statute. Upon the trial of the 
case, the plaintiff might not have read the deposi-
tions and could have proven an entire different 
account. The defendant was entitled to be served 
with 1a copy of the account, up~n which the plain-
tiff ex~pected to rely at the trial of the case. 
''Several states have practically the same 
provision as section 69 qf our Code of Civil Pro-
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cedure. The Court of .... \ppeals of Colorado, in the 
case of s.cott et al. Y. Frost, 4 Colo. App. 557, 36 
Pac. 910, held that a similar statute was peremp-
tory in this reg'ard, and that, upon demand, the 
plaintiff \Yas required to furnish the defendant 
\Yith a eopy of the account, and that if he failed 
to do so the court could not permit any evidence 
to be introduced as to such account. The Supreme 
Court of ~Iinnesota, in the case of Lonsdale v. 
Oltman, 50 }finn. 52, 52 N. W. 131, announces 
the same rule. Arppellant could have avoided the 
p·en:alty of the statute by a compliance with its 
terms "~hich are clear and explicit.'' 
II. 
NOT FINDING ON MATERIAL ISSUES OF ACCOUNTING OF MONIES 
ADVANCED BY PLAINTIFF TO THE ACCOUNT OF DEFENDANT. 
Appellant in paragraph 9 of her complaint (R. 3) 
alleges: 
"9. That the defendant has never rendered 
an accounting of his labor in the erection of said 
Lodge, such that this plaintiff has no knowledge 
as to what proportionate interest is claimed by 
said defendant in the total expenditures for the 
purchase of the land and erection of the Lodge 
and operation of said business, and that no ac-
counting of said business has ever been given by 
the defendant to the plaintiff although the same 
has been demanded and that defendant still fails 
and refuses to render such an !accounting or 
transfer such proportionate interest as is equit-
able to the plaintiff i·n and to the real property 
hereinbefore mentioned.'' 
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To paragraph 9 of plaintiff's complaint, respondent 
in his Answer, (R. 8) alleges: 
"8. Answering paragraph 9, defendant al-
leges that all of the records in connection with 
the erection and operation of said lodge have 
been kept by plaintiff under agreement between 
plaintiff and defendant and that defendant has 
not been granted access to said records by the 
plaintiff and is accordingly unable to render an 
accounting and further that he has no knowledge 
or information concerning the financial status of 
the undertaking.'' 
Thus the question of an accountancy of the monies 
advanced by ap.pellant to respondent becomes a material 
issue to determine what the status of the partnership 
account was at the day of closing of the business. 
There has been no Finding made nor any Conclusion 
or Decree with reference to whether or not respondent 
may have had monies available which he could have paid 
out on accounts of the partnership business instead of 
:paying out of personal funds. Evidence of payment on 
at least one personal account is disclosed by the record 
as follows: (R. 108-9) 
CROSS EXAMINATION OF DEFEND·ANT 
BY MR. BEATIE 
'' Q. N oV\r, as a matter of fact, of these par-
ticular monies which were being put into your 
bank account, the operation of this business, 
you've expended over $700 of that sum on a pur-
chase of a car for yourself, haven't you~ 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. You haYen'tf 
.... -\.. Yes, l\Iary gave me the check, th,at 's right, 
sir, I am not-
Q. You made out the cheeks, didn't you, all 
the timeJ? 
~-\.. :\fary ""as a witness to that. 
Q. Did ~~ou draw the check~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you would. sign the check, wouldn't 
you, by which these bills were paid~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Over the period of this time, you have 
paid $700 and some-odd dollars on your car, 
haven't you~ 
A. Yes sir, I believe Mary and I had an 
agreement on that. 
Q. I don't care-
THE COURT: Let him tell us about it: I do 
care about it. 
A. Well, sir, I think we had an agreement on 
it; I was getting little bit of the money from the 
Government, see, out-I mean, money I got from 
the Government, why, we used for just this and 
that, and I believe the $700, why, that Mary and 
I agreed on the car. 
THE COURT: 746, something like that~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: I saw that figure here once. 
MR. BEATIE: December 24, I believe. 
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THE COURT : December 19, '46, there is a 
check to Motorway Service for $776.94. 
A. Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: That was paid by you on a 
car for yourself' 
A. Yes, sir, but the agreement was between 
Mary and I on it.'' 
This Court has repeatedly held: 
''It is the well settled law in this jurisdiction 
that it is the duty of the trial court to find upon 
all of the material issues r1aised by the 'pleadings, 
whether evidence resp~ecting them was or was not 
adduced, and that it is pTejudicial error for the 
trial court to fail to find upon issues raised by 
the pleadings and the evidence. ' ' 
The following case is cited in support of the above 
statement: 
965. 
Duncan v. Hemmelw,right et ux 186 Pac (2d) page 
Justice Wolfe said at pages 968-9: 
''We pass now to consideration of the second 
assignment of error, i.e., the failure of the court 
to make findings of fact on cert~ain issues. It is 
well settled in this jurisdiction that failure to 
make findings of fact on material issues is error, 
and is ordinarily prejudicial. Dillon Implement 
Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Utah 1, 88 P. 670; Holm v. 
Holm, 44 Utah 242, 139 P. 937; Snyder et al. v. 
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v. Sabey, 58lTtah 343, 198 P. 1110; Baker v. Hatch, 
70 Utah 1, 257 P. 673; Prows v. HavYley et al., 72 
Utah 444, 271 P. 31; Simper v. Brown, 7 4 Utah 
178, :278 P. 529 ; Piper v. Eakle, 78 Utah 342, 2 P. 
2d 909; ''Test v. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300, 
17 P. :2d 292; Parowan Mercantile Co. v. Gurr et 
al., 83 Utah 463, 30 P. 2d 207; Pike v. Clark, 95 
Utah 235, 79 P. 2d 1010." 
III. 
IN FINDING AS IT DID IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT AS FOLLOWS: ''THAT DURING AND SINCE THE ERECTION 
OF THE LODGE, DEFENDANT HAS MADE MONETARY ADVANCES 
TO THE VENTURE totaling $1,388.49, '' AND ENTERING ITS 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BASED ON SAID FINDING THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS ENTITLED TO 23% OF THE PROCEEDS RESULTING FROM 
THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS : 
(A) THAT DEFENDANT MADE NO ACCOUNTING OF MONIES AD-
VANCED NOR DID HE SHOW THAT THERE WERE NOT SUFFICIENT 
MONIES ADVANCED BY PLAINTIFF TO PAY THE BILLS CLAIMED 
BY DEFENDANT. (B) THAT MONIES CLAIMED TO BE PAID WERE 
NOT PROVEN BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
(a) The record discloses, as is set forth In the 
following schedule, the ¥arious sums advanced hy appel-
lant and I have thus segregated the schedule to show 
those ~payments made by appellant to respondent's bank 
account and those paid directly for the benefit of the 
business. 
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Advanced by Appellant to Respondent's B~ank 
Account or Paid For by Respondent. 
Bank Acct. Paid Out 
R.45 Admitted by pleadings 3,000.00 
R. 50 Exhibit C 600.00 
R. 51 Exhibit D 4,500.00 
R. 52 Exhibit E 2,350.00 
R. 52 Exhibit F 900.00) 
500.00) 
R. 54 Exhibit G 810.32 
R. 55 Exhibit I 1,028.94 
R. 55 Exhibit J 68.75 
R. 56 Exhibit K 20.00 
R. 56 Exhibit L 20.00 
R. 57 Exhibit M 7.05 
R. 59 Exhibit N 49.00 
R. 60 Exhibit 0 93.70 
R. 62 Exhibit P 625.00 
8,850.00 5,722.76 
Money placed in bank account $8,850.00 
Money e:x:pended for business 5,722.76 
Total $14,572.76 
Exhibit A discloses that there was income from the 
operation of the business, as shown in recapitulation of 
receipts, the sum of $1492.05, by sales of merchandise, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
and $453.10 from machine-Jute Box, etc., making a 
total of $1945.15, "~hirh said latter amount was received 
in the operation of the business. By adding the sum of 
$8,850.00 adYanced by appellant to respondent's bank 
accotmt and the total item of cash receipts of the opera-
tion of the business, the cash sum is $10,795.15, no 
amounts of \Yhich are accounted for by the respondent. 
III. 
IN FINDING AS IT DID IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE :E1INDINGS OF 
FACT AS FOLLOWS: "THAT DURING AND SINCE THE ERECTION 
OF THE LODGE, DEFENDANT HAS MADE MONETARY ADVANCES 
TO THE VENTURE TOTALING $1,388.49. '' 
(b) The Court allowed the defendant and re-
spondent the sum of $1388.49, which is made up of the 
various items in the Bill of Particulars: 
Utah Power and Light Comp·any 
Mulholland Lumber Comp·any-
Exhibit 1 
Park Record-Exhibit 3 
Mulholland Hardware Co. 
Young Electric Sign Company 
Total 
$ 261.38 
462.51 
12.60 
250.00 
402.00 
$1388.49 
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With reference to the v~arious amounts, the afore-
said item of $261.38, there is no testimony in the record to 
rprove said amount and the only reference to the same is 
(R. 88): 
''THE COURT: Let me ask him about these 
items, Mr. Beatie, ask your client what about this 
power and light. You doubt they paid $261.38 in 
connection with the operation there~ 
MISS BALLEN: I don't know anything 
about it. I know part of the power and light was 
paid out of the business, out of the money taken 
in. You can check books if you want; I don't know 
"rhether part of that was paid; I don't kno'v ho"r 
they could h'ave light bill of that size when not in 
operation.'' 
THE COURT : What about an item for slot 
machines ~'' 
The above is the only reference to the aforesaid 
item and is not evidence of the payment of any bill to 
the Utah Power and Light Company. 
The next item is for the sum of $402.00. 
The following testimony is the only evidence with 
reference to the same: (R. 90-91-92) 
"MR. BEATIE: Object to this ex parte state-
ment; no- -
THE COURT: Don't know whether material 
or not; right now just inquiring about bills, or 
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about Young Electric Sign Company rental on 
neon sign: you got documentary sup~port on that 1 
.. A... I paid it up to July. 
THE COURT: July, '48~ 
.A.. Until April, yes, sir. 
THE COlTRT: What do you mean by "until 
.A. pril' ' J? 
.A... .A..ll I had to give them $110 when they 
put sign in, before they put sign in, from there 
until April, I paid them $36.50 1a month for the 
rental of the sign. From April, I told them I 
didn't want the sign any more, and they sent me 
this bill for-
THE COURT: Then, since April, '48, you 
haven't paid it~ 
A. No, sir. 
THE COURT: But $402 is the total you paid 
on that sign rental up to April~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
MR. BEATIE : May I inquire just this with 
reference to th-at~ Perhaps sti~pulate; Mr. Gas-
parae, $402, that included the $110 down-payment~ 
A. Sir, I ~plaid them, the-
MR. BEATIE: Just answer the question: 
Does it, or doesn't it~ 
THE COURT: Just told me before it did 
while you were talking to your client. 
MR. BEATIE: It does include-
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THE COURT: It does. 
MR. BEATIE: We can not so stipulate, that 
was paid by them because I am informed that 
$110 will show as expenditure in the journal, 
vvhich is Exhibit A. 
A. Sir, I gave Mary receipt for that money, 
but I paid that money myself. Mary wasn't at 
the Lodge 'at the time I got that sign. I gave her 
receipt for that sign in November. 
THE COURT: The $110~ 
A. Y-es, sir. 
THE COURT : You paid the rest of it; that 
Is you-
A. That sign-
THE COURT: All right. 
Q. Did you make any payments after April 
of '48 on that sign~ 
A. I have made one, I believe, fifty -dollar 
payment; I have no receipt for it, and they sent 
me the bill for the balance of the sign.'' 
F·rom the above testimony it is clearly evident that 
there is no testimony at all with reference to the sum of 
$261.38, nor is there any proof, other than the statement 
of respondent that he paid the sum of $292.00 on account 
of Young Electric Sign Company. 
The Court erred then in giving credit on the item 
of $261.38 and $402.00, assuming that evidence of the 
credits are proper. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
45 
IN FINDING :\S IT DID IX PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT AS FOLLO,YS : 
''THAT THE SERVICES PERFORMED BY THE DE:FENDANT FROM 
SEPTE)IBER, 1946, TO FEBRUARY, 1947, IN ERECTING THE 
LODGE HAVE A REASONABLE YALUE OF $2,160.00, SAID AMOUNT 
BEIXG BASED ON AX AVERAGE OF TEN HOURS WORK PER DAY 
FOR SIX DAYS PER "\"\~EK FOR 24 WEEKS AT THE RATE OF $1.50 
PER HOUR; THAT THE SERVICES PERFORMED BY THE DEFEND-
A.:XT IN MANAGING, OPERATING AND MAINTAINING THE LODGE 
DrRIXG THE PERIOD FROM FEBRUARY, 1947, UNTIL JUNE, 1947, 
HAYE A REASONABLE VALUE OF $1,440.00, SAID AMOUNT BEING 
BASED OX AN AVERAGE OF TEN HOURS PER DAY FOR SIX DAYS 
PER WEEK FOR 16 WEEKS AT THE RATE OF $1.50 PER HOUR : 
THAT THE SERVICES PERFORMED BY THE DEFENDANT IN MAN-
AGING, OPERATING AND MAINTAINING THE LODGE FOR THE 
PERIOD FROM JUNE TO NOVEMBER, 1947, HAVE A REASONABLE 
VALUE OF $714.00, SAID AMOUNT BEING BASED ON AN AVERAGE 
OF SEVEN HOURS PER DAY FOR 6 DAYS PER WEEK FOR 17 WEEKS 
AT THE RATE OF $1.00 PER HOUR,'' AND ENTERING ITS CONCLU·-
SION OF LAW BASED ON SAID FINDING THAT DEFENDANT AFTER 
PAYMENT OF DEBTS FROM THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF THE 
PROPERTY WAS ENTITLED TO 23% THEREOF, FOR THE FOLLOW-
ING REASON: (a) THAT THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE O:F 
THE SERVICE OF DEFENDANT IS THE RATE OF $1.00 PER HOUR 
AND THE TOTAL NU.MBER OF HOURS WORKED IS SPECULATIVE. 
The following is the record which discloses the testi-
mony of the respondent as to the amount of work ex-
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Jl·ended and the rate of pay on the building of the Little 
Pine Lodge. (R. 80) 
"MR. NESLEN: That is what I want to ask 
him. 
Q. Mr. Gas parae, in building this Lodge, just 
e:x!plain to the court what you did. 
A. Well, I did just about everything-! mean, 
I took care of-" (R. 81) 
'' Q. Well, what specifically did you do l\fr. 
Gasparac, in building the Lodge~ 
MR. BEATIE: Let's tie the time, will you, 
so we can at least have right of cross e)Camination. 
Q. When did you start to build this Lodge, 
Mr. Gasparac ~ 
A. I don't remember exact date; it was in 
Se:ptember. 
Q. Had you done any work in connection 
with this venture prior to September, '46 ~ 
A. I was the one that looked over the prop-
erty and made arrangements for the property. I 
made 'arrangements for the survey, and I did most 
of the work checking the property and everything. 
Q. Now, did you hire any help in connection 
with the building of this Lodge~ 
A. Yes, Mary's brother and the two friends 
and the carpenter." (R. 82). 
'' Q. Did you yourself do any work in connec-
tion. with the building of this Lodge~ 
A. Yes, I did. 
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Q. ~lanual work, \vhat \vas the nature of that 
work! 
.. A.. I worked on it from the time we started; 
I 'vorked ""'"ith her brother from the first time we 
started it right on up until it was finished, I 
did everything." (R. 83) 
'' Q. X o"~, \Yhat hours did you \vork in the 
construction of this Lodge~ 
A. Oh, I couldn't-couldn't put it down as 
any amount of hours~ I mean, I worked all day 
and some of the nights. 
Q. Did you have any other employment dur-
ing that time~ 
A. Mary's brother helped me. 
Q. I mean, did you have any other job during 
that time~ 
A. Oh, no; none at all. I devoted my full 
time to the Lodge from the time I started it until 
it was finished. 
Q. That was a period of about how many 
months~ 
A. That was from September till July; I 
never worked excep.t at the Lodge from Septem-
ber till July.'' (R. 84) 
'' Q. After the Lodge was completed in F'ehru-
ary, what work did you do in connection with this 
venture~ 
A. Well, I run the Lodge, and Mary also ; I 
mean we worked; we opened it up and we run it 
at night; in the daytime, I would work around 
the Lodge with things that had to he done. The 
Lodge wasn't fully complete; it isn't fully com-
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and I worked on it all the time. 
Q. Did you do 1any other work on the build-
ing of the Lodge after February~ 
A. Yes, I worked all, in the summer doing the 
landscaping, and we have a pumphouse that we 
had to build, reservoir and everything ; all that 
had to be fixed.'' (R. 100-101) 
''MR. BEATIE : No further cross examina-
tion, your Honor. 
MR. NESLEN: No further questions. 
THE COURT : I would like to ask him one 
or two questions. 
MR. BEATIE: I hope it isn't what I didn't 
desire to cross on. 
THE COURT : I don't care what your hopes 
tare, Mr. Beatie, I have to find out about these 
things ; that is, certain things, I see, that are not 
covered in the testimony to my satisfaction. I 
still don't know what kind of work you did in 
building that Lodge, except that you were the 
general supervisor of the work; are you a car-
penter, or do you do carpenter work~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You did do some carp·enter work~ 
A. Well, sir, if you would let me, I could 
· probably tell you in my own words just what-
there was no question-! mean, when we built the 
Lodge, between Mary and I, there was no question 
·as to whether I was a carpenter or not. I was to 
handle the building of the Lodge, and I did every-
thing. I did everything from digging ditches to 
pouring cement, carpenter work. 
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THE COURT: I a1n not talking about 
whether you are a technieal journeyman with a 
card, but you haven't told me 'vhat you did 1as 
yet. Right now, you told me more than you did 
before. You did every kind of '"·ork 'vith your 
handsJ? 
_ . .-\.. Yes, sir. 
THE COURT : You didn't stand around 
"~atehing other people work, and hiring them; you 
actually got in and worked~ 
... -\.. Yes, sir. 
(The following examination is by THE CO·URT) 
Q. What do you base this figure of $600 a 
month on 1 How do you arrive at a figure of $600 
a month? You just pick that out of the air, or 
actually base on some hourly rate on what you 
did, or how did you arrive at it~ 
A. I can't answer that, I mean, the way you 
put the question. 
Q. Answer it way you would like to answer 
it, but tell me where you arrive at that figure 
somehow or other. 
A. My full time-I might be able to tell you 
this way: My full time from the time I started 
that Lodge has been spent with it. I spent all my 
time with it; that is all I did. If it wasn't build-
ing it, it was something concerning it. I wasn't, 
or I was doing something all the time. (R. 103-
104) 
Q. Let me ask y-ou this : How much did you 
pay these boys that did the labor you referred to, 
two boys besides her brother~ 
A. ·I believe Mary has-
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Q. You can't tell me~ 
A. I don't remember, s1r, I never handled 
any of the books. 
Q. Pay by the day or by the hour~ 
A. Yes, sir, 'Paid by the hour. 
Q. Do you know what the hourly r;ate was~ 
A. A dollar an hour, sir. 
Q. Well, was your time worth-more valu-
able than theirs~ 
A. Well, no, I wouldn't say that. 
Q. How many hours did you actually put in 
on this place~ 
A. Sir~ 
Q. How many hours did you actually put in 
on this place, working on it? 
A. Some days, I would put in fifteen hours 
on it. 
Q. Well, could you give us some idea of how 
many hours you put in, ialtogether? 
A. No, I couldn't, sir. 
Q. From September until February-Sep-
tember, 1946 till February, 1947 when it opened, 
that is when it was substantially constructed; 
wasn't it~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then, thereafter, you both operated the 
lodge, and also did more construction work~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. FL"{ed up and painted and other inciden-
tals necessary to keep the Lodge in a proper-
.L-\.. Yes, sir. 
Q. -shape. You ever compute the hours you 
put in on this Lodge~ 
... ..-\.. ~ o, sir, I never; I never even thought 
about it. I never kept a receipt or anything. I 
nev-er had -any reason to do that. 
Q. You have a reason, now, don't you, you 
are claiming some compensation for your efforts 
there~ 
.... -\.. Well-
Q. I understand you didn't ever keHp a cur-
rent account of the time you put in, but, since 
that time, and since this lawsuit haven't you com-
puted about how much time you put in on this 
Lodge~ 
A. No, sir, I am paying bills right now for-
and still paying bills on it, and I still don't keep 
the receipts for it. 
Q. Now, I understand your testimony is the 
same as hers about the matter of your agreement 
to construct the Lodge together~ 
A. Yes, sir." (R. 106) 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
By MR. NESLEN: 
'' Q. I believe you testified, in answer to the 
Judge, that you were-rate of pay in building the 
Lodge was not worth any more than these labor-
ers; did you say that~ 
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A. Well, yes, I mean, not the way he put it, 
I mean I didn't-when I was building the Lodge, 
I wasn't hired out; I wasn't hired out for any 
rate of pay." 
From the above evidence it is clear that there never 
was any testimony on the part of the respondent or any 
other person that his services were worth more than 
$1.00 per hour, thus the Court would be in error in com-
puting the first two items of work on the part of the 
respondent between September 1946 and June 1947 at 
the rate of $1.50 per hour when the third item of labor 
is only at the value of $1.00 per hour. It is further con-
tended that there is no proof of the working of any as-
certained number of hours on the part of the respondent 
between September 1946 and November 1947. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment in favor of plaintiff and defendant 
should be reversed. That the Court erred in admitting 
evidence on the part of the res'pondent to prove the value 
of labor and monies expended when no Bill of Particu-
lars 'vas filed. Further, in not finding as to the material 
issues and accounting of monies advanced by the plain-
tiff, plus the monies in the sum of $1,945.15 income from 
the operation of the business, in a total sum of $10,-
795.14, of which not one penny is accounted for. ·Further, 
that there was no showing or any finding of there not 
having been sufficient monies advanced by ~ap~pellant or 
income from sales to pay all bills claimed by respondent, 
and that there was not any proof of S"aid bills, claimed 
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paid by respondent 'Yhirh the ('1ourt gave eredit for, nor 
"1'ere the monies rlaimed paid by defPndant on account 
of business debts proven by competent evidence. Fur-
ther, that the testimony upon "1'hich the defendant was 
granted an agg:regate sum of $4,314.00 for services per-
formed, is in error, that defendant never proved his ser-
vices "Torth more than $1.00 per hour and no certain 
number of hours \Yere ever proven to be the basis of his 
work credit. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted, that the case 
should be reversed and remanded to the trial Court for 
accounting in the matter and further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. D. BEATIE, 
Attorney for Plamtiff 
and Appellant. 
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